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ACM PODC Participants List <[log in to unmask]>
Spyros Kontogiannis <[log in to unmask]>
Tue, 1 Aug 2006 09:45:53 -0400
Spyros Kontogiannis <[log in to unmask]>
text/plain (111 lines)
|                            WINE 2006                             |
|    2nd International Workshop on Internet & Network Economics    |
|                  December 15--17, Patra, GREECE                  |
|                                                                  |
|                     http://wine2006.cti.gr/                      |
|                                                                  |
|                   LIST OF ACCEPTED PAPERS                        |
|                                                                  |
|               [apologies for multiple receipts]                  |

Davide Bilo`, Luciano Guala` and Guido Proietti. Dynamic Mechanism

Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman and Noam Nisan. Mixed Strategies in
Combinatorial Agency

Martin Hoefer and Jean Cardinal. Selfish Service Installation in

Heiner Ackermann, Heiko Roeglin and Berthold Voecking. Pure Nash
Equilibria in Player-Specific and Weighted Congestion Games

Dominic Dumrauf and Martin Gairing. Price of Anarchy for Polynomial
Wardrop Games

David Abraham, Ning Chen, Vijay Kumar and Vahab Mirrokni. Assignment
Problems in Rental Markets

Nicole Immorlica, Kamal Jain and Mohammad Mahdian. Game-Theoretic
Aspects of Designing Hyperlink Structures

Pradeep Dubey, Rahul Garg and Bernard De Meyer. Competing for
Customers in a Social Network: The Quasi-Linear Case

Spyros Kontogiannis, Panagiota Panagopoulou and Paul Spirakis.
Polynomial Algorithms for Approximating Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix

Ola Rozenfeld and Moshe Tennenholtz. Strong and Correlated Strong
Equilibria in Monotone Congestion Games

Pradeep Dubey and Rahul Garg. Games of Connectivity

Xi Chen, Xiaotie Deng and Shang-Hua Teng. Sparse Games Are Hard

Ping Li, Housheng Chen and Guangdong Huang. On Portfolio's
Default-Risk-Adjusted  Duration and Value: Model and Algorithm Based
on Copulas

Rahul Garg and Sanjiv Kapoor. Price Roll-Backs and Path Auctions: An
Approximation Scheme for Computing the  Market Equilibrium

Tian-Ming Bu, Qi Qi and Aries Wei Sun. Unconditional Competitive
Auctions with Copy and Budget Constraints

Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Nikhil Devanur and Vijay Vazirani. New
Results on Rationality and Strongly Polynomial Time Solvability in
Eisenberg-Gale Markets

Dorit Hochbaum. Ranking sports teams and the inverse equal paths

Miko?aj Morzy and Adam Wierzbicki. The Sound of Silence: Mining
Implicit Feedbacks to Compute Reputation

Pinyan Lu, Shang-Hua Teng and Changyuan Yu. Truthful Auctions with
Optimal Profit

Abraham Flaxman, David Gamarnik and Gregory Sorkin. First-passage
percolation on a width-2 strip and the path cost in a VCG auction

Igal Milchtaich. The Equilibrium Existence Problem in Finite Network
Congestion Games

Carmine Ventre. Mechanisms with Verification for Any Finite Domain

Paolo Penna, Guido Proietti and Peter Widmayer. Strongly
Polynomial-Time Truthful Mechanisms in One Shot

Mukund Sundararajan, Shuchi Chawla and Tim Roughgarden. Optimal
Cost-sharing Mechanisms for Steiner Forest Problems

Juliane Dunkel and Andreas S. Schulz. On the Complexity of
Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in Congestion and Local-Effect Games

Xi Chen, Li-Sha Huang and Shang-Hua Teng. Market Equilibria with
Hybrid Linear-Leontief Utilities

Antoniy Ganchev, Lata Narayanan and Sunil Shende. Mechanisms to
induce random choice

Shuchi Chawla, Jason Hartline, Uday Rajan and R. Ravi. Optimal
No-deficit Mechanism Design

Nicole Immorlica, Robert Kleinberg and Mohammad Mahdian. Secretary
problems with competing employers

Burkhard Monien, Florian Schoppmann, Karsten Tiemann and Vladimir
Mazalov. Wardrop Equilibria and Price of Stability for Bottleneck
Games with Splittable Traffic

Theodore Komninos, Yannis Stamatiou and George Vavitsas. A worm
propagation model based on people's email acquaintance profiles

Constantinos Daskalakis, Aranyak Mehta and Christos Papadimitriou. A
Note on Approximate Nash Equilibria