================================================================== Joint Workshop on the Economics of Networked Systems and Incentive-Based Computing (NetEcon+IBC 2007) June 11, San Diego, USA http://netecon-ibc.si.umich.edu/ ================================================================== Call for Papers ================================================================== The emergence of the Internet as a global platform for computation and communication has sparked the development and deployment of many large-scale distributed systems. Often, these systems involve multiple stakeholders with divergent or even competing interests. Unmitigated selfish behavior in these systems can lead to high inefficiency or even complete collapse. There has been an increasing interest in applying economic and game-theoretic principles to help analyze and design such systems. The NetEcon+IBC Workshop aims to promote a cross-disciplinary discussion on the role of incentives in computational and communication systems. It will bring together researchers from a diverse set of areas including systems, theory, distributed computing, artificial intelligence, and economics. NetEcon+IBC 2007 will be held in conjunction with the 2007 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'07) which is part of the 2007 Federated Computer Research Conference (FCRC'07). In the spirit of FCRC, the workshop combines two successful workshops from previous years: the workshop on the Economics of Networked Systems (NetEcon) and the Workshop on Incentive-Based Computing (IBC). Submissions should be at most 6 pages in length with 10pt fonts or larger. Additional information (such as proofs) may be included in a clearly marked appendix, which will be read at the discretion of the the referees. Papers will be selected based on both technical merit and their potential to spark discussion at the workshop. Accepted papers will be published on the workshop website. Topics of interest include, but are not limited to: * Potential roles of economics in networks: analysis, design, or just a distraction? * Application of incentive mechanisms for peer-to-peer systems, grids, SPAM, security, Internet routing and peering, wireless networks, etc. * Methods for engineering incentives and disincentives (e.g., reputation, trust, control, accountability, and anonymity, etc.) * Empirical studies of strategic or non-strategic behavior in existing systems * Incentive mechanisms for scheduling, resource allocation, and computation * Models and solution concepts (e.g., evolutionary games, repeated games, cooperative games, etc.) * Algorithmic mechanism design and distributed protocols based on markets or auctions * Experimental methodologies for testing incentive schemes * Privacy-preserving incentive mechanisms * What systems researchers think theoreticians should do, and vice versa? Important Dates: ================ Deadline for paper submission March 26, 2007 Notification of acceptance April 30, 2007 Deadline for camera-ready papers May 21, 2007 Workshop date June 11, 2007 Program Committee: ================== Vincent Conitzer, Duke University John Douceur, Microsoft Research Michal Feldman, Hebrew University Daniel Grosu, Wayne State University (co-chair) Herve Moulin, Rice University Ramesh Johari, Stanford University Ratul Mahajan, Microsoft Research (co-chair) Tim Roughgarden, Stanford University Rahul Sami, University of Michigan (co-chair) Alex Snoeren, University of California at San Diego Paul Spirakis, Computer Technology Institute Xiaowei Yang, University of California at Irvine ===================================================================