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      Joint Workshop on the Economics of Networked Systems and
           Incentive-Based Computing (NetEcon+IBC 2007)

    		    June 11, San Diego, USA

 		http://netecon-ibc.si.umich.edu/

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                        Call for Papers
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   The emergence of the Internet as a global platform for
computation and communication has sparked the development and
deployment of many large-scale distributed systems. Often, these
systems involve multiple stakeholders with divergent or even
competing interests.  Unmitigated selfish behavior in these
systems can lead to high inefficiency or even complete collapse.
There has been an increasing interest in applying economic and
game-theoretic principles to help analyze and design such systems.

   The NetEcon+IBC Workshop aims to promote a cross-disciplinary
discussion on the role of incentives in computational and
communication systems. It will bring together researchers from a
diverse set of areas including systems, theory, distributed
computing, artificial intelligence, and economics.
NetEcon+IBC 2007 will be held in conjunction with the 2007 ACM
Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'07) which is part of the
2007 Federated Computer Research Conference (FCRC'07). In the
spirit of FCRC, the workshop combines two successful workshops
from previous years: the workshop on the Economics of Networked
Systems (NetEcon) and the Workshop on Incentive-Based
Computing (IBC).

   Submissions should be at most 6 pages in length with 10pt fonts
or larger. Additional information (such as proofs) may be included
in a clearly marked appendix, which will be read at the discretion
of the the referees. Papers will be selected based on both
technical merit and their potential to spark discussion at the
workshop. Accepted papers will be published on the workshop
website.

Topics of interest include, but are not limited to:
* Potential roles of economics in networks: analysis, design, or
   just a distraction?
* Application of incentive mechanisms for peer-to-peer systems,
   grids, SPAM, security, Internet routing and peering, wireless
   networks, etc.
* Methods for engineering incentives and disincentives (e.g.,
   reputation, trust, control, accountability, and anonymity, etc.)
* Empirical studies of strategic or non-strategic behavior in
   existing systems
* Incentive mechanisms for scheduling, resource allocation, and
   computation
* Models and solution concepts (e.g., evolutionary games, repeated
   games, cooperative games, etc.)
* Algorithmic mechanism design and distributed protocols based on
   markets or auctions
* Experimental methodologies for testing incentive schemes
* Privacy-preserving incentive mechanisms
* What systems researchers think theoreticians should do, and vice
   versa?


Important Dates:
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Deadline for paper submission           March 26, 2007
Notification of acceptance              April 30, 2007
Deadline for camera-ready papers        May 21, 2007
Workshop date                           June 11, 2007


Program Committee:
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       Vincent Conitzer, Duke University
       John Douceur, Microsoft Research
       Michal Feldman, Hebrew University
       Daniel Grosu, Wayne State University (co-chair)
       Herve Moulin, Rice University
       Ramesh Johari, Stanford University
       Ratul Mahajan, Microsoft Research (co-chair)
       Tim Roughgarden, Stanford University
       Rahul Sami, University of Michigan (co-chair)
       Alex Snoeren, University of California at San Diego
       Paul Spirakis, Computer Technology Institute
       Xiaowei Yang, University of California at Irvine

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